

**A New Penal Populism?
Rodrigo Duterte, Public Opinion, and the War on Drugs in the Philippines**

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Abstract

President Rodrigo Duterte has waged a violent and highly popular campaign against drug-related criminality in the Philippines. Is the high level of support for Duterte and the drug war evidence of penal populism? This paper theorizes that preferences over penal policy are associated with deeper attitudes towards the political system, namely populist attitudes and preferences for charismatic leadership. Using evidence from surveys conducted in the Philippines in 2016 and 2017, the paper demonstrates a positive relationship between populist attitudes and support for the campaign against illegal drugs in general and the extra-judicial killing of suspected drug users and dealers in particular. It also provides a novel measurement of charismatic leadership, and demonstrates a relationship between belief in the charisma of Duterte and support for the campaign against illegal drugs.

Introduction

Penal populism refers to an understanding of justice in which criminal and anti-social activity should be harshly punished. It is based on the premise that too often the legal system works to the advantage of criminals and society's already privileged, especially the legal, political, and economic elite. Penal populism implies that criminal justice should be informed by the views of "ordinary individuals rather than... elite opinion" (Pratt 2007: 5). Motivated more by outcome than by process, penal populism promises order, if not the law. This understanding of justice goes along with a preference for strong leadership that is unconstrained by institutions. Penal populists are charismatic leaders who rely more on plebiscitary norms of legitimacy than on rules, institutions, and regularized procedures. Although research has demonstrated links between crime levels, public opinion, and penal policy (Newburn 2007, Jennings, Farrall et al. 2017), many aspects of the penal populism paradigm remain undertheorized and untested.

Recent research from a wide variety of contexts has demonstrated that populism, in the sense of a pro-people and anti-elite ideology, is measurable in public opinion (Akkerman, Mudde et al. 2013, Elchardus and Spruyt 2014, Bakker, Rooduijn et al. 2016, Spruyt, Keppens et al. 2016, Stavrakakis, Andreadis et al. 2016, Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel 2018a). Those holding populist attitudes are distrustful of elites, believe in plebiscitary notions of legitimacy, and have a polarized, even Manichean, view of the world (Mudde 2004, Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008, Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018). We theorize that these attitudes should be associated with support for summary justice over legal procedure. A somewhat different notion of populism as a distinctly charismatic form of mass politics (Mouzelis 1985, Kenny 2017), though less established empirically as a set of attitudes (Davies 1954, Antonakis, Avolio et al. 2003, Merolla,

Ramos et al. 2007), leads to similar predictions. Charismatic authority, by its nature is unbounded by tradition or the law (Weber 1978). We thus also theorize that those who view a leader as having the gift of charisma should share a dim view of the legal system, in turn favouring immediate and rough justice over procedure.

The Philippines would seem to be an ideal venue in which to interrogate the penal populism thesis. In late 2016, Rodrigo Duterte rode to the presidency of the Philippines as a populist, anti-establishment candidate, promising to scale up the “strongman” rule that he honed during his years as mayor of Davao City on the southern island of Mindanao. In power he has waged a violent campaign against drug-related criminality, with estimates of the number of those killed in the first 18 months of his presidency running as high as 12,000.¹ Randy David has termed his brand of “tough guy” rule *Dutertismo*, while the president himself welcomes the nickname “Duterte Harry” after Clint Eastwood’s quasi-vigilante character in the Dirty Harry series of movies (Miller 2018).²

Yet in spite of widespread condemnation by international and domestic human rights activists, support for Duterte and for the anti-drug campaign within the Philippines remains resilient across class, gender, geographic, and ethnoreligious groups. As of June 2018, only three percent of Filipinos oppose the campaign against drug related criminality in spite of widespread knowledge of its most egregious consequences and a fear of being mistakenly caught up in it. Support for

¹ Human Rights Watch, “Philippines: Duterte’s ‘Drug War’ Claims 12,000+ Lives”, 18 January 2018, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/01/18/philippines-dutertes-drug-war-claims-12000-lives>, retrieved 10 August 2018; the number of deaths already far exceeds that experienced under the authoritarian rule of Ferdinand Marcos.

² Randy David, “Dutertismo”, *Inquirer.net*, 1 May 2016, <http://opinion.inquirer.net/94530/dutertismo>, retrieved 10 August 2018.

Duterte and the war on illegal drugs has been explained in terms of a new penal populism, with the people's will taking precedence over the law (Curato 2017b, McCoy 2017b, Pepinsky 2017).

Using evidence from surveys conducted in the Philippines in 2016 and 2017,³ we estimate the extent of populist attitudes and belief in Duterte's charisma among Filipinos, and then test their relationships with attitudes toward penal policy. We find evidence of a positive relationship between populist attitudes and support for the campaign against illegal drugs, even among those who fear they or their families might be victims of it. We also find robust support for a relationship between populist attitudes and support for its harshest components, in particular the extra-judicial killing (EJKs) of suspected drug users and dealers who resist arrest. We also find evidence of a relationship between belief in the charisma of Duterte and support for the campaign against illegal drugs, but not between belief in Duterte's charisma and support for EJKs. We draw on additional historical survey data and data on crime rates to investigate the causal relationship between Duterte and public opinion on crime. We find evidence that dissatisfaction with government performance on crime preceded Duterte's entry into national politics. However, evidence from a survey experiment indicates that support for the anti-drug campaign itself is driven in part by Duterte's own popularity.

This paper advances both the penal populism and populism research agendas in at least three ways. First, while existing empirical research has simply *equated* preferences for harsh penal policies with penal populism (Newburn 2007, Jennings, Farrall et al. 2017), we provide the first demonstration that preferences over criminal justice have a deeper populist attitudinal basis. This has implications that go well beyond the Philippines case. Research shows that populist attitudes

³ To preserve the anonymity of the authors for double-blind peer review, we do not provide the identity of the polling organization used in this study.

are widely held across democracies in the West, not least in the United States (Hawkins, Riding et al. 2012b). Context matters, of course, but it could be that leaders and parties that depend on voters who hold such attitudes may find that the weakening of judicial processes *enhances* their popularity.

Second, although existing research has long claimed that populism is associated with top-down, charismatic forms of leadership (Mouzelis 1985, Roberts 1995, Weyland 2001, Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008, Barr 2009, Roberts 2014, Kenny 2017), this dimension of populism has not been as systematically empirically investigated from a public opinion perspective. We provide a novel approach to the measurement of charismatic leadership and find that populist attitudes and belief in a leader's charisma are not correlated with each other, yet are each correlated with preferences over penal policy. Attitudes towards charismatic leadership are an important set of beliefs in their own right that are distinct from populist attitudes more broadly. It may be that leaders to whom a large body of voters attribute charismatic authority are freer to evade legal constraints and even to erode democracy itself.

Third, research on the "leadership effect" both with respect to party support and popular endorsement of particular policies remains mixed (Zaller 1992, Rottinghaus 2010). We show that while entrepreneurial political leaders may respond to popular concerns, they also have the capacity to drive support for particular government policies. In this sense, populist or charismatic leadership may be part cause and part effect of the salience of divisive social issues such as crime and immigration.

Penal Populism

Populism remains an elusive concept, literally meaning a practice, system, or doctrine of the people. Scholars have variously conceptualized what this people-centric form of politics might mean, whether a set of redistributive economic policies (Dornbusch and Edwards 1991, Edwards 2010), a charismatic form of political mobilization (Mouzelis 1985, Kenny 2017, Weyland 2017), a lowbrow political style (Ostiguy 2009, Moffitt 2016), a plebiscitary or illiberal form of democracy (Urbinati 1998, Pappas 2015, Müller 2016), or a political ideology that places the people's will over that of the elite (Mudde 2004, Crick 2005, Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018). No definition is necessarily *true* than another, and as some authors have argued it may be that populism in practice combines elements of both form (e.g. charismatic leadership) and substance (e.g. anti-elite ideology) (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008, Barr 2009, Roberts 2014).

We take from the ideological school the idea that populism can be understood as a set of beliefs about how the political world should be ordered. As one proponent puts it, populism in this sense is a “thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus the ‘corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people” (Mudde 2007: 23). People holding such populist attitudes prioritize the folk wisdom of common people over the technocratic capacity of elites, and value the spontaneous judgment of the crowd over abstract procedure (Canovan 1999, Taggart 2000).

The ideological conceptualization is particularly relevant in this context as it corresponds to how the term has typically been employed in research in criminology and sociology on penal populism (Pratt 2007). The notion of penal populism is based on the premise that there is a popularly held world view in which regular people have a better sense of justice than elites or

politicians; legal procedures and rules work to the benefit of criminals and elites (especially lawyers), who know how to manipulate them, rather than to protect victims. For their part, the “people are less and less prepared to leave questions, including difficult penal questions to their masters” (Ryan 2004: 9). While individual freedoms are important to those holding this world view, criminality and anti-social behaviour are offenses that need to be punished severely. The will of society’s majority, the *people*, should take priority over that of the *other*, the minority to which it is opposed.

There is evidence of an association between authoritarian attitudes and tough law and order policies (including capital punishment) (Stack 2003, Stevens, Bishin et al. 2006), but as yet there has been no test of whether a similar relationship exists between populist attitudes and preferences over penal policy. Rather, public support for tough on crime policies is itself taken as *evidence* of penal populist attitudes. Building in part on the idea of the “authoritarian mindset” (Hetherington and Weiler 2009), a growing body of research demonstrates that there exists a set of populist attitudes or personality traits (Hawkins, Riding et al. 2012b, Akkerman, Mudde et al. 2013, Elchardus and Spruyt 2014, Bakker, Rooduijn et al. 2016, Spruyt, Keppens et al. 2016, Stavrakakis, Andreadis et al. 2016, Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel 2018a). We expect there to be a positive association between populist attitudes in general – a positive view of the common people as compared to the elite – and so-called penal populist attitudes on crime – weak support for judicial process and strong support for harsh penalties.

In practice, when we speak of populism, we typically also speak of *populists*. That is, while populism as an ideology may refer to a belief that the people’s will should prevail over that of the elite, in practice this ideology often coalesces into the form of a charismatically-led mass

movement (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008, Barr 2009, Roberts 2014). Relatively leaderless mass movements in which participants articulate ostensibly populist positions can exist; Occupy Wall Street and the Tea Party would seem to be examples on opposing sides of the ideological spectrum. However, to the extent that people holding populist beliefs are suspicious of technocracy and formal institutions in general (Caramani 2017), we would expect them to have a particular sympathy for a plebiscitary forms of legitimacy that endow a leader to channel the popular will directly.

A great deal of disagreement and confusion arises with respect to the use of charisma as a political science concept. First, in common language, charisma is often thought of as a personality trait; as some quality that an individual possess. Indeed, even Max Weber, with whom the concept is most closely associated, confusingly stated that charisma refers to “a certain quality of an individual personality by which he is set apart and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or... exceptional powers or qualities.” However, reading Weber more carefully, it becomes clear that charisma describes a relationship. An individual is charismatic only to the extent that his followers *treat him as endowed* as such. As Weber argued: “It is recognition on the part of those subject to authority which is decisive for the validity of charisma” (Weber 1978: 242). A charismatic leader is made so by popular acclaim rather than by rules, tradition, or personal favor. Charisma, in other words, is “an attribute of the belief of the followers and not of the quality of the leader” (Bensman and Givant 1975: 578).

Second, charismatic authority is also often mistakenly conflated with authoritarianism. It is common, for instance, to describe leaders like Hitler or Putin as being charismatic (Rees 2012). It is true that a charismatic leader’s authority is not grounded in tradition or rules. However, at

the same time, charismatic leadership depends substantially on the popular will. The “genuinely charismatic ruler” is “responsible to the ruled – responsible, that is, to prove that he himself is indeed the master willed by God... If the people withdraw their recognition, the master becomes a mere private person.” (Weber 1978: 1114-1115). It is worth recalling that Hitler, certainly at the height of his power, was tremendously popular (Gellately 2001); we could say the same of Putin today. A charismatic leader shares a kind of unstated contract with the people; they support him unconditionally and he rules in their name. At the same time, although charismatic leadership is not reducible to authoritarianism, this does not mean that the leader is merely a vessel for the popular will. As Weber put it, a charismatic leader “does not derive his claims from the will of his followers, in the manner of an election; rather, it is their duty to recognize his charisma” (Weber 1978: 1113). Charismatic leadership, in other words, is a form of leadership in which popular support is crucial, but in which a leader drives, rather than merely responds to, public opinion on specific policies.

For our purposes, what is critical about charismatic authority is that it is distinct from a traditional or bureaucratic rules-based order. People who believe that a leader is endowed with charisma should have less of an attachment to laws and procedures per se. Whatever the leader does is legitimate because *He* does it. This attitude reflects, in other words, a deep suspicion of institutions. In this sense, we theorize that belief in a leader’s charisma should be associated with support for order over law, street justice over due process.

Our hypotheses are that populist attitudes and the attribution of charismatic leadership to Duterte should be associated with support for the campaign against illegal drugs in the Philippines and support for EJKs specifically.

Duterte and the War on Drugs

Rodrigo Duterte worked as a public prosecutor in Davao City before becoming vice mayor in 1986 and mayor in 1988. He held the latter position for more than 20 years, repeatedly rejecting numerous calls for him to run for the presidency before he formally filed as a substitute for a party-mate in late November 2016. From early 2015 until he formally launched his candidature, Duterte had toured the country pushing a federalist agenda. Once launched, his campaign promoted the slogan “change is coming” although it remained unclear what the content of this change would be. Duterte was promoted as the “man on horseback” who would challenge the establishment, or as he put it, “Imperial Manila” (Miller 2018). Duterte’s abstract promises were complemented by the slogan *tapang at malasakit* (courage and compassion), a characterization first put out in a video circulated on social media in late May 2015. His campaign subsequently used the phrase in its other ads, this time directly linking the traits with Duterte through the phrase *Tapang at Malasakit si Duterte* (Duterte is courageous and compassionate). Fusing the first syllable of each trait, the shortened message becomes *Tama si Duterte* (Duterte is right) (Holmes 2016).

It was only in the months before the election that Duterte aggressively campaigned on the issue of drug-related criminality. Duterte drew on his reputation as the strongman mayor of Davao City, vowing to rid the country of illegal drugs within six months of his confirmation. In early March 2016, he pronounced that if elected president, he would kill thousands of criminals, the funeral parlours would be packed, and he would dump 100,000 of the slain criminals in Manila

Bay where the fish would grow fat.⁴ He was known for saying: “If you are not prepared to kill and be killed, you have no business being president of this country.”⁵ He promised no mercy, saying “God will weep if I become president” (Miller 2018: 14).

Duterte has frequently been described as both a populist (McCoy 2017a, McCoy 2017b, Heydarian 2018, Kenny forthcoming) and specifically as a penal populist (Curato 2017b). By almost any definition he meets the criteria. His sister, Eleanor, said “He is being used as a vehicle of the Holy Spirit” (Miller 2018: 15), while he himself seems to believe that it is his destiny to lead his country. In spite of holding subnational office for more than 20 years, Duterte portrayed himself as an “outsider” to the Manilla-based elite. Duterte swore, dissed his political opponents, and derided long-sacrosanct institutions from the Church to the media (Casiple 2016). He relied heavily on campaign rallies, mass media, and social media to deliver his message directly to voters. Most Filipino registered voters (77 percent) say that television was the most influential source of information for them in their vote choice for president. The significant increase in pre-election support for Duterte (from 24 percent in March 2016 to 35 percent in April 2016) might be partially attributed to his performance in the second presidential debate, which was carried live by major television and radio networks. In an April 2016 survey, a plurality (34 percent) of respondents who watched, listened to or read reports about the debate believed that Duterte bested the other contenders. Beyond the debates, Duterte, given his controversial and often crude behaviour, commanded extensive airtime. While his language is often derisive, misogynistic, and vulgar, it is common to hear his audience applaud or laugh at

⁴ “Kill the Criminals! Duterte’s vote-winning vow”, 16 March 2016, *Inquirer.net* <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/774225/kill-the-criminals-dutertes-vote-winning-vow>, retrieved 10 August 2018.

⁵ Randy David, “Dutertismo,” *Inquirer.net*, 1 May 2016, <http://opinion.inquirer.net/94530/dutertismo#ixzz554QleIXs>, retrieved 10 August 2018.

his controversial statements, especially when he ridicules his critics. He also had – and has – an army of online supporters who vigorously defend him on social media, shouting down and even threatening his critics. From his campaign through his early presidency, Duterte has also made a point of making frequent public appearances. He has gone to combat zones, urban poor communities, and areas affected by natural disasters, among others to speak directly with “regular” Filipinos.

Although relatively unknown outside of Mindanao just months before the 2016 presidential election, Duterte quickly became the most popular candidate and won the election in a landslide, assuming control of the presidency at the end of June 2016. Duterte quickly made good on his promises to aggressively pursue those involved in the illegal drug trade. Duterte’s war on drugs comes under a program known as *Oplan Double Barrel*. In the circular memorandum on the program, the program’s main implementer, the Philippine National Police (PNP), cited Duterte’s vow to rid the country of illegal drugs within the first six months of his term as its primary rationale. The two barrels refer to the two main components of the program — *Project Tokhang* (a portmanteau of *toktok* [knock] and *hangyo* [plead]) and *Project HVT* (the acronym referring to *High Value Targets*). These two components essentially replicate the anti-illegal drug war waged by Duterte when he was mayor of Davao City. In some respects, *Oplan Double Barrel* continues the approach of the anti-crime program of the preceding Benigno Aquino administration, *Oplan Lambat-Sibat* (Oplan Dragnet-Spear). Its implementation in practice, however, has been radically different. To ensure that his campaign would be zealously pursued, Duterte appointed the former police chief of Davao City, Ronald “*Bato*” [The Rock] de la Rosa, as head of the PNP. de la Rosa warned criminals “[not only will we] crush [you], we will bury you. I will bury you all.”

Within the first month of its implementation, *Tokhang* resulted in around 330,000 suspected drug users and dealers surrendering, over 9,000 arrests, and 664 deaths. In its most recent report, the PNP acknowledged that there were 4,279 deaths related to the government's war on drugs from July 2, 2016 to May 21, 2018. Other organizations estimate that between July 2016 and January 2018 up to 12,000 people have been killed by state security forces or by non-state groups working with implicit sanction from the authorities.⁶ An earlier report indicated that most of the recorded fatalities were from the National Capital Region, Central Luzon, Southern Tagalog, and Central Visayas, densely populated areas where *Tokhang* operations from the start were more intense, purportedly because these are the regions that have the highest levels of drug addiction.

The massive number of deaths has led members of the political opposition and human rights advocates to criticize Duterte's drug war. For example, Senator Leila de Lima, who had been an outspoken critic of Duterte during his time in Davao City, called for an investigation of the deaths arising from *Oplan Double Barrel*. Duterte responded with verbal attacks of his own and eventually, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed cases against de Lima, leading to her arrest in late February 2017. After the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Agnes Callamard spoke of the need to investigate alleged extra-judicial killings in the country, Duterte threatened to slap Callamard should she persist with an investigation. The elitist, and even foreign, sources of these challenges have tended to enhance rather than weaken Duterte's support.

⁶ Human Rights Watch, "Philippines"

Duterte made no apologies for the deaths, even likening himself to Hitler, saying that he was prepared to exterminate millions in his effort to wipe out drug dealers and users.⁷ Public support for Duterte or the war on drugs, although robust, is not immutable. The death in October 2017 of Kian de los Santos, a 17 year-old student, who resided in a poor community in Caloocan, highlighted what critics believed to be an excessive disregard for due process and the right to life in Duterte's anti-drug war. While the police who conducted the operation in Kian's village claimed that the teenager shot at pursuing officers, a subsequently released video showed that he was manhandled by the police. A follow up investigation revealed that Kian did not in fact have a firearm. The victim's mother publically demanded an answer as to why the "government is killing poor, innocent people". More than a thousand people attended Kian's funeral procession with a call to stop the killings, while Duterte's satisfaction ratings dropped in a prominent national survey. However, Duterte turned the blame for the incident on the offending officers and suspended operations. He met with the victim's parents, who themselves subsequently called for an end to protests against the government in Kian's name. The parents even posed for a picture with Duterte, their right arms raised with the trademark fist bump of the president. Duterte's support, if it in fact dropped at all, quickly recovered. To the public, Duterte, even if his administration makes mistakes, is a "rare politician who doesn't forget about the people" (Curato 2017a).

Data

⁷ Karen Lema and Manuel Mogato, "Philippines' Duterte likens himself to Hitler, wants to kill millions of drug users," *Reuters*, 30 September 2016, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-duterte-hitler/philippines-duterte-likens-himself-to-hitler-wants-to-kill-millions-of-drug-users-idUSKCN1200B9>, retrieved 10 August 2018.

To test the relationships between populism, charismatic leadership, and support for the administration's violent campaign against illegal drug dealers and users, we rely primarily on survey modules that we embedded in nationally representative surveys conducted by a Filipino polling organization in September 2016 and September 2017. Each survey was based on a national sample of face-to-face interviews with 1,200 adults (over 18). To adequately cover the regional diversity of the Philippines, 300 respondents were selected from four study areas: the National Capital Region (NCR), Luzon (excluding the capital), Visayas, and Mindanao. Multi-stage probability sampling was used to select 60 sample barangays, which is the smallest administrative division in the Philippines, equivalent to a district or ward, from each of the study areas. We also had access to all additional survey results, conducted at irregular intervals, from 2011 to 2018. For surveys including and prior to March 2016, the total sample size was 1,800, distributed as follows: the National Capital Region (NCR): 230; Luzon (excluding the capital): 790; Visayas: 350; and Mindanao: 430. The procedure for selecting Barangays is described in the Appendix.

Measuring Populist Attitudes


In this section we describe how our measure of populist attitudes is constructed. In recent years, several survey items have been proposed to capture populist attitudes in the sense outlined above (Hawkins, Riding et al. 2012a, Akkerman, Mudde et al. 2013, Schulz, Müller et al. 2017, Castanho Silva, Ioannis Andreadis et al. 2018). We implemented the 6-item battery of Akkerman, Mudde et al. (2013), which was the most widely used instrument at the time of our study. The questions were designed to capture the degree to which individuals prioritize the will of the people over the views of the elite. Respondents were asked to rate their agreement with the

following statements on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (I very much disagree) to 5 (I very much agree):

1. The politicians in Congress need to follow the will of the people.
2. The people, not the politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.
3. The political differences between the people and the elite are larger than the differences among the people.
4. What people call “compromise” in politics is really just selling out on one’s principles.
5. I’d rather be represented by an ordinary citizen than an experienced politician.
6. Politicians talk too much and take too little action.

We normalize responses between 0 and 1 and construct a populist attitude scale based on the average of individuals’ responses to all 6 items. Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of populist attitudes amongst respondents. The inter-item correlation of responses to these items in the Philippines case is modest but comparable to that observed in other non-European cases (Cronbach’s $\alpha = 0.60$) (Andreadis and Ruth 2018).

Figure 1 Populist Attitudes in the Philippines



We also investigated whether populist attitudes were correlated with some respondent characteristics, namely the region of the respondent and her social class. Survey data indicates that Duterte has consistently higher approval ratings in his home state of Mindanao (in September 2016, his approval rating was 93 percent in Mindanao compared to 86 percent nationally). In the Appendix, Table A2 compares mean populist attitudes across the four survey regions, and Table A3 tests whether populist attitudes in Mindanao are different from those elsewhere. We find no evidence that this is the case. We also examine populist attitudes by social class. Table A4 in the Appendix shows that there is no statistically significant difference in populist attitudes across the main middle and upper (ABC) and lower middle and lower (DE) social classes. Perhaps more importantly, however, we show that populist attitudes at the population level themselves vary over time. To date, published research on populist attitudes has been cross-sectional. While we do not have the panel data needed to test whether these attitudes are variable at the individual level, our data does show that in the aggregate populist attitudes were marginal higher in 2017 than in 2016 and that the difference is statistically significant.

Although imperfect, this result indicates that populist attitudes are in part endogenous to the political context, a factor that future cross-sectional research on the effects of populist attitudes should take into account.

Measuring Charisma

Charisma is notoriously difficult to measure. Management studies have typically operationalized charisma as a set of personality traits that respondents believe a leader to have. They include having vision, pride, selflessness, optimism, enthusiasm, confidence, respect, power, morals, values and beliefs, and a sense of purpose or mission (Antonakis, Avolio et al. 2003). This approach has been replicated in political science (Merolla, Ramos et al. 2007). Problematically, however, Weber himself used charisma in a very different sense. He meant it to signify a form of leadership that was wholly distinct from the bureaucratic or traditional. While these traits listed in existing studies are largely positive and while they may correlate into a particular personality type, it is not clear how they distinguish a truly “charismatic” leader from a “regular” one.

Whether people believe a leader to be charismatic in the Weberian sense is of course difficult to measure and the existing literature provides little explicit guidance (Davies 1954, Willner 1984).

To measure this sense of charisma, rather than pre-determine a set of charismatic traits and then measure the extent to which respondents ascribe these traits to Duterte, we instead asked respondents to give an open-ended description of him (in Filipino) in a word or sentence. We next sought to code whether respondents were describing Duterte as either a charismatic or regular leader. To do this we wanted as open a procedure as possible. Thus, rather than using an expert or machine coding approach, which would require the detailed specification of a set of key words in advance, we instead used crowd-sourced non-expert text analysis (Benoit, Conway

et al. 2016).⁸ This approach allowed us to leave the interpretation of a respondent's description open within the confines of Weber's broad understanding of what makes a leader charismatic.

We instructed our Filipino-speaking coders as follows:⁹

Each of the following words or sentences was used by respondents in a recent survey to describe some political leaders. We would like you to say whether you think the respondent believes the leader in question to be "charismatic". A charismatic leader is one who people believe to be gifted with extraordinary personal qualities. Respondents who believe that a leader is charismatic may describe him or her as heroic, infallible, or superlative in some other way. This is in contrast to "regular" leaders who people typically describe in terms of professional competences, policies, or achievements. Do these listed words/phases suggest that the leader being described is charismatic?

For quality control, coders were also required to answer test questions, in which we provided descriptions of our own, which in our view clearly corresponded to charismatic or regular leadership respectively. Test descriptions were randomly presented to coders along with the original respondents' descriptions. Coders who failed to answer a minimum of 70 percent of the test questions were blocked from coding further responses. For a list of our test questions and their coding see table A1 in the Appendix. Coders were able to identify charismatic and regular leadership with a good degree of accuracy. 73 percent of the judgments of the charismatic leadership test descriptions were accurate (i.e., matching with our own judgment), while 78 percent of the judgments of regular leadership test descriptions were accurate (see Figure A1

⁸ We used the Figure-Eight platform, which was previously known as Crowd Flower.

⁹ Translation available in the Appendix.

Appendix). No individual coders failed to meet the 70 percent accuracy standard. 42 coders (with unique identities) made between 10 and 350 judgments (10 percent of which were test questions). We obtained a minimum of five judgments per description, coding as charismatic only those with at least 80 percent of judgments in agreement. 953 respondents' descriptions were coded to be of *Charismatic leader*, while 1,447 were not. The attribution of charisma to Duterte is higher in Mindanao (see Table A2 and Table A3 in the Appendix) but it does not differ by social class (see Table A4 in the Appendix). The attribution of charisma to Duterte was lower in 2017 than in 2016 (recall that populist attitudes were higher in 2017) (see Table A5 in the Appendix). Populist attitudes and the attribution of charisma to Duterte are not correlated with one another (see Table A6 in the Appendix).

Control Variables

We include controls for social class and region. Social class is measured as a dummy variable, taking on the value of 1 if a respondent is from the upper A, B, or C classes, and 0 if she is from the lower D or E classes. We also include a dummy variable for Mindano in some model specifications. We include a survey dummy for all models in which responses are pooled across surveys.

Populist Attitudes, Charisma, and Penal Policies

We now examine the relationship between populist attitudes, belief in Duterte's charisma, and penal policy. Our main dependent variable is whether respondents support the following statement, with responses ranging from 1 (I truly do not support) to 5 (I truly support):

Do you support or not support the campaign against illegal drugs of the Duterte administration?

Our principal approach is an ordered logistic regression model (over the range of support for the campaign). Table 1 shows that both populist attitudes and the attribution of charisma to Duterte are associated with increased support for the anti-drug campaign. Results on both coefficients are statistically significant. Model 1 includes controls for social class and a year dummy, while model 2 also includes a dummy variable for Mindanao. As we expected, the Mindanao dummy is itself associated with support for the campaign.

Table 1 Ordered logit models of support for anti-drug campaign

	(1)	(2)
Populist attitudes	0.757** (0.372)	0.819** (0.376)
Charismatic leader	0.422*** (0.0945)	0.374*** (0.0957)
Socio-economic class	0.0403 (0.161)	0.109 (0.163)
2017 dummy	-0.163 (0.0976)	-0.196** (0.0989)
Mindanao		0.894*** (0.112)
Observations	1,789	1,789

Standard errors in parentheses

** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

We also carry out two logit models of supporting (1, 2)/not supporting (3, 4, 5) the campaign and truly supporting (1)/not truly supporting the campaign (2, 3, 4, 5) (see Appendix table A2,

models (1) and (2) respectively). All models include the Populist attitudes scale, the Charismatic leader variable, the respondent's socioeconomic class, and a survey year dummy variable. The association between the attribution of charisma to Duterte remains significant as shown in models 1 and 2 of Table A7 in the Appendix. However, populist attitudes are only statistically significantly associated with the most enthusiastic support for the campaign (model 2 in Table A7 in the Appendix) (i.e. "truly support").

Those who hold populist attitudes are also particularly concerned with crime as a social problem. Table 2 presents the results of ordered logit models in which the dependent variables are importance that respondents attach to "Fighting Criminality" as a pressing social problem (model 1) and "Enforcing the law on all, whether influential or ordinary people" (model 2).

Additionally, overall, populist attitudes and belief in Duterte's charisma are both associated with a positive rating of the government's performance in "Fighting criminality" (see Table A8 in the Appendix) (note that this is not the same dependent variable as in Table 2). These findings, especially that of model 2 in Table 2, suggest that there may be a particular affinity between populist attitudes and preferences for punishing those normally believed to evade criminal justice. It provides, in other words, very solid evidence that penal populist attitudes do have a basis in a deeper set of attitudes about political order.

Table 2 Ordered logit models of support for anti-drug campaign

	(1) Fighting Crime	(2) Enforcing Law on All
Populist attitudes	1.060** (0.486)	1.895*** (0.477)
Charismatic leader	0.164 (0.113)	0.214 (0.110)
Socio-economic class	0.373 (0.294)	0.148 (0.279)
Observations	1,200	1,200

Standard errors in parentheses

** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

However, there is also good evidence to suggest that respondents are not merely expressing approval of the government's general efforts to tackle crime in general or drug-related crime in particular, but of the harsh, often extra-judicial punishment meted out to drug traffickers and users. As of September 2017, 77.9 percent of respondents said that they believe that extra judicial killings were occurring, while 72.6 percent of respondents were at least somewhat concerned that they themselves might be killed as a result of the campaign against illegal drugs. In other words, there is little ambiguity about the kinds of harsh tactics implied in our general question about support for the Duterte government's anti-illegal drug campaign. We ran additional tests on support for the campaign controlling for whether a respondent feared being a victim of the campaign (Appendix Table A9 model 1) and just restricting the sample to those who feared being a victim of the campaign (Appendix Table A9 model 2). Results remain robust.

We also attempted to capture more precisely the relationship between populist attitudes and support for the most extreme penal policies, namely EJKs. To get at this, we asked respondents

whether they supported a number of strategies deployed by the administration in the campaign against illegal drugs. The strategies are: 1.) Increased police patrols in the community, 2.) house to house inquiry from village officials, 3.) rehabilitation of drug users, 4.) arrest of suspected drug users or pusher for a period of 36 hours while the formal case is being prepared, and 5.) killing by the police of alleged drug addicts or pushers who resist arrest. The meaning of the latter term is clear to Philippine respondents as it is the commonly deployed official euphemism for targeted assassinations by police. For clarity, we construct a binary variable in which respondents who answered “agree” or “very much agree” to all 6 populist survey items were coded as populist, while those who did not were coded as non-populist. 380 of 2,400 respondents across our two surveys are coded as populist in this way.

Table 3 Strategies Supported by Populists and Non-populists

Strategy	Populist	Non-populist	P-value
Increased patrols	0.691	0.734	0.3589
House inquiries	0.609	0.440	0.001
Rehab for users	0.836	0.712	0.0074
Detention of suspects	0.482	0.397	0.1017
Killing of resisting suspects	0.164	0.059	0.0002

Table 3 compares the mean level of support for each strategy for respondents coded as populist and those coded as non-populist. Support for increased police patrols and the detention of suspects are not statistically significantly different between the two groups. However, populists are more likely to support the other three strategies, including most notably the killing of suspects who resist arrest. Over 16 percent of populists support the killing of resisting suspects while under 6 percent of non-populist respondents support it.

Table 4 Support the Killing of Suspects who Resist Arrest

	(1) Attitudes Scale	(2) Binary
Populist attitudes	3.659*** (1.268)	1.126*** (0.322)
Charismatic leader	0.0500 (0.324)	0.0673 (0.325)
Socio-economic class	-0.254 (0.544)	-0.189 (0.546)
Constant	-4.891*** (0.897)	-2.766*** (0.229)
Observations	599	599


Standard errors in parentheses

** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Further controlling for social class and whether a respondent views Duterte as a charismatic leader in a multivariate logistic regression, we find that populist respondents are 3.6 times more likely to support the killing of suspects who resist arrest than non-populist respondents (model 2 in Table 4). This relationship remains robust to using a scaled measure of populism rather than a binary one (model 1 in Table 4). Notably, we find no evidence for a relationship between the attribution of charismatic leadership to Duterte and support the killing of suspects who resist arrest. Support for EJKs is not common, most likely reflecting the belief that the killing of suspects who resist arrest is an extreme measure that may be illegal and is perhaps immoral (just 47 out of 599 respondents asked this question admitted support for the strategy). It thus may be unsurprising that those who attribute positive leadership traits to Duterte do not necessarily associate him personally with EJKs. Duterte himself has distanced himself from especially egregious EJKs, such as that of the unarmed young man, Kian, described above.

Figure 2 illustrates the marginal effect of populist attitudes (scale) and the probability of supporting the killing of resisting suspects, holding other variables at their means (based on model 1 in Table 4).

Figure 2 Logit models of support for killing of suspects




In sum, we find that support for the campaign against illegal drugs in a broad sense is strongly correlated with populist attitudes in general and with the attribution of charismatic leadership traits to Duterte. We also find that support for EJKs is correlated with populist attitudes but not with the attribution of charismatic leadership traits to Duterte.

Duterte and Crime

In this section, we assess whether the relationship between populist attitudes and beliefs about crime are in some way mediated, or even generated, by support for Duterte. Research elsewhere shows that populist attitudes are correlated with support for populist parties, even controlling for parties' and voters' issue positions (Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel 2018b). Thus, it may be that

the apparent correlation between populist attitudes and support for tough penal policies is due to support for Duterte as a populist and the associated approval of any policy positions he happens to hold.

Figure 3 Approval Ratings of Duterte



In spite of international condemnation, domestic approval of Duterte has remained robust. On coming to office, Duterte registered a trust rating of 91 percent (July 2016); it declined to 76 percent in March 2017, rising back slightly to 80 percent in March 2018 and returning close to its high (86 percent) in June 2018. Similarly, as Figure 3 illustrates, Duterte’s performance rating remains positive and robust. 86 percent of approved of his performance in September 2016, and although this figure dropped to 80 percent in December 2017, it has since returned to a new peak (88 percent) in June 2018.

In a multivariate logistic model, we find no evidence of a relationship between populist attitudes and approval of Duterte or trust in Duterte (see Table 5). Given that Duterte is commonly described as a populist, the lack of any association is noteworthy. We do find support of a

relationship between the attribution of charismatic leadership traits and approval of and trust in Duterte. However, as the traits associated with charisma tend to be positive (though not by definition) this result is somewhat trivial. Together, however, these results suggest that populist attitudes are associated with support for tough on crime policies per se, not simply – or not even – support for Duterte as a populist leader.

Table 5 Populist Attitudes, Charisma, and Approval/Trust Ratings

	(1) Approve Duterte	(2) Trust Duterte
Populist attitudes	0.0441 (0.321)	0.302 (0.321)
Charismatic leader	0.515*** (0.0797)	0.501*** (0.0796)
Socio-economic class	-0.168 (0.148)	-0.112 (0.149)
2017 year dummy	-0.266*** (0.0786)	-0.286*** (0.0786)
Observations	2399	2399

Standard errors in parentheses


** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

We next examine the relationship between attitudes on crime, crime rates, and support for Duterte as a presidential candidate. There is some evidence that Duterte’s singular campaign increased the salience of drug-related criminality to Filipinos in the immediate lead up to the 2016 election but it is also clear that concerns over criminality had become an issue well before Duterte launched his campaign. In October 2015, respondents were asked, in an open ended question, to identify the primary problem or issue in their locality that should be immediately

addressed by the next president. In this survey, the largest plurality (21.2 percent) of respondents identified illegal drugs as the primary problem or issue in their place that should be addressed immediately by the next president. Illegal drugs was the top concern for a third of the respondents in the National Capital Region (33.5 percent) and the most affluent socio-economic Class (ABC) (30.7 percent), the region and socio-economic class where Duterte would consistently obtain significant pre-election and election support. The proliferation of illegal drugs was also the most pressing concern for the largest socio-economic Class D (21.1 percent).¹⁰ Illegal drugs eclipsed the second most important problem, the lack of jobs/livelihood that was identified by a little over a fifth of the respondents (20.7 percent) and was also the chief concern for those in Mindanao (23.2 percent) and the poorest socio-economic Class E (23.4 percent). In the first half of 2016, the number of respondents rating “Curbing the widespread sale and use of illegal drugs” as the most important issue facing the nation rose from 36 percent in January to 39 percent in February and to 41 percent in April. The results of these surveys partially explain the appeal of Duterte as he zeroed in on the drug problem as an anchor issue during his campaign. Unsurprisingly, indeed, pre-election support for Duterte is positively associated the perception that crime is the most important issue in the Philippines. In short, there is some evidence that Duterte’s campaign increased the salience of drug-related criminality for voters, but declining approval of how the previous government was handling crime was already evident before Duterte’s campaign had begun.

¹⁰ In our surveys, the largest socio-economic class D comprise around 65% of the population. The poorest socio-economic class E constitutes around 25% of the population, while the remaining 10% are classified in the wealthiest Class, ABC.

Figure 5 Approval Ratings of Government on Fighting Crime and National Crime Rates



As shown in Figure 5, while approval of the Aquino government’s performance in fighting criminality had hovered at around 60 percent between January 2011 and January 2014, approval had begun declining in mid-2012, and continued this decline to a level of around 45 percent even before Duterte had declared his candidature for president. As this trend suggests, Filipinos had come to sense that crime fighting was “undersupplied”; to the extent that Duterte promised to rectify this trend, approval of his government’s performance on fighting crime increased. In part, as Figure 5 shows, this declining approval rating may have been caused by real increases in the level of crime. Figure 5 also plots crime rates as reported by the Philippine National Police. As Table 6 shows, approval of crime fighting between 2011 and 2015 is negatively related to a one year lag in crime rates (significant at the 5 percent level).

Table 6. Crime Rates and Approval of Government Handling of Crime

	(1)
	Approval
Crime Rate	-0.00316 (0.00692)
Crime Rate 1 yr. lag	-0.0172** (0.00594)
Constant	66.08*** (4.449)
Observations	15
Adjusted R^2	0.398

Standard errors in parentheses
** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Support for the campaign on illegal drugs has remained robust since Duterte's election. As figure 5 illustrates, there was a considerable increase in approval of the government's performance in fighting crime following Duterte's election. As of March 2018, 85 percent of respondents support the anti-drug campaign. Only 3 percent do not support it. These figures are very similar to those expressed in the survey conducted in September 2016. Surprisingly, this overwhelming support exists in spite of the widespread reservations about police conduct that we noted above, with about half of respondents in a March 2017 survey believing that the police disregards the rights of drug suspects in the conduct of its operations. Recall again that support for the campaign does not differ across those who fear being a victim of the campaign and those who do not (table A9 in the Appendix).

Table 7 Duterte Endorsement Experiment

	Support campaign against illegal drugs	Support campaign against illegal drugs of the Duterte administration	P-value
Mean level of support	4.290	4.438	(<0.01)
N	589	600	

Determining the degree to which support for the anti-illegal drug war policies is driven by Duterte is a complex matter. To get at this, we embedded an endorsement experiment within the September 2016 survey (conducted three months after Duterte’s election). We split our survey sample in two, with one group being asked whether they supported the anti-illegal drug campaign, and the other group being asked whether they supported *Duterte’s* anti-illegal drug campaign. Table 7 shows that the mean level of support was higher in the group asked whether they supported was Duterte’s campaign (statistically significant at the 1 percent level). Thus, while there is evidence that there was a pent-up demand for tough on crime policies prior to Duterte’s election that would have led to support for these penal policies irrespective of Duterte’s charismatic appeal, we find some evidence that Duterte himself has a positive effect on support for the campaign.

Conclusion

The causal linkages between populist attitudes, support for charismatic leaders, and policy preferences remains under-developed. This paper has attempted to parse out some of these relationships. It thus advances both the penal populism and populism research agendas in at least three ways. First, our findings suggest a direct pathway between populist attitudes and policy preferences. In this case, populist attitudes are correlated with the most intense support for a

tough police program with few constraints and for all of the most intensive measures taken in the conduct of the campaign, including the killing of resisting suspects. While scholars of populism operating within the ideational paradigm have tended to de-link populist attitudes from any particular set of policies or interests, arguing instead that populist attitudes are consistent with both left and right host ideologies, our findings instead indicate that populist attitudes may go hand in hand with more specific policy preferences when these are also framed in terms of the interests of “good” or “common” people. For instance, although theoretical scholarship has (correctly) sought to parse nativism and populism, the results presented in this paper suggest a way of explaining the affinity between the two. Anti-immigrant policies, unlike say pro-worker policies or protectionism, which have more diverse economic impacts, can be easily framed as being in the interests of the people. Criminals and ‘illegal’ immigrants are especially prone to being excluded from “the people” and so policies that target them, whether tough policing or beefing up of border security, are an easier sell to those who are sceptical of “politicking” and tend to favour the wisdom of the common man.

Second, while existing empirical research has simply *equated* preferences for harsh penal policies with penal populism (Newburn 2007, Jennings, Farrall et al. 2017), we provide the first demonstration that preferences over criminal justice have a deeper populist attitudinal basis. Critically, moreover, the evidence strongly suggests that populist attitudes have an association with preferences over criminal justice that are independent of the effect of the political leadership. This has implications that go well beyond the Philippines case. Research shows that populist attitudes are widely held across democracies in the West, not least in the United States. Leaders and parties that depend on voters who hold such attitudes may find that the weakening of judicial processes *enhances* their popularity.

Finally, although existing research has claimed that populism is associated with top-down, charismatic forms of leadership, this dimension of populism has not been systematically empirically investigated (Mouzelis 1985, Roberts 1995, Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008, Barr 2009, Roberts 2014, Kenny 2017). We provide a novel approach to the measurement of charismatic leadership and find that populist attitudes and belief in a leader's charisma are uncorrelated with each other, yet are themselves correlated with distinct but related sets of preferences over penal policy. Attitudes towards charismatic leadership are an important set of beliefs in their own right that are distinct from populist attitudes more broadly. It may be that leaders to whom a large body of voters attribute charisma are freer to evade legal constraints and even to erode democracy itself.

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Appendix

Procedure for selecting sample barangays:

For the NCR:

Stage 1: Selection of Sample Barangays: 60 barangays were distributed among the 17 cities and municipalities in such a way that each city/municipality was assigned a number of barangays that was roughly proportional to its population size. An additional provision was that each municipality must have one sample barangay. Barangays were selected at random from within each city/municipality.

Stage 2: Selection of Sample Households: In each sample barangays map, interval sampling was used to draw 5 sample households. A starting street corner was drawn at random. The first sample household was randomly selected from the households nearest to the starting street corner. Subsequent sample households were chosen using a fixed interval of 5 households in between the sampled ones; i.e., every 6th household was sampled.

Stage 3: Selection of the Sample Adult: In each selected household, a respondent was randomly chosen among household members who were 18 years of age and older, using a probability selection table. To ensure that half of the respondents were males and half were females, only male family members were pre-listed in the probability selection table of odd-numbered questionnaires while only female members were pre-listed for even-numbered questionnaires. In cases where there was no qualified respondent of a given gender, the interval sampling of household continued until five sample respondents were identified.

For the rest of the Philippines:


Stage 1: Allocation of sample barangays to Regions: Within each major area, 60 barangays were allocated to the regions proportional to household population size.

Stage 2: Allocation and Selection of Sample Cities/Municipalities to Regions: Within each study area, 15 cities/municipalities were allocated to the regions proportional to household population size. Sample cities/municipalities were selected without replacement and with probability proportional to household population size.

Stage 3: Selection of Sample Barangays: Once the cities/municipalities have been selected, 60 barangays were distributed among the sample cities/municipalities in such a way that each city/municipality was assigned a number of barangays roughly proportional to its household population size. However, each city/municipality must be assigned with at least one sample barangay.

Sample barangays within each sample city/municipality were selected with equal probabilities.

Figure A1 Accuracy of Non-Expert Coding of 'Regular' and 'Charismatic' Leaders in Test Questions



x axis represents percentage of 'judgments' that accurately code the survey description.

Table A1 Test Descriptions of Charismatic and Regular Leadership

Description	Coding	Justification
honest	Regular	Characteristic of normal political leader. Honesty does not signify that the leader being described has a special or unique characteristic in the perception of the respondent.
corrupt	Regular	Characteristic of normal political leader. Corrupt is a description that can be applied to any leader. It is not distinctive to charismatic ones.
heroic	Charismatic	Classic description of charismatic leader. Heroism is a typical characteristic associated with Charisma. Regular leaders are very unlikely to be described in this way.
mean	Regular	Characteristic of normal political leader. Mean is negative personal characteristic that could be applied to any regular leader. The respondent clearly does not believe that the leader being described is charismatic.
majestic	Charismatic	Classic description of charismatic leader. The respondent in this case believes that the leader has special, royal, or even divine qualities. A regular leader would not be described in this way.
competent	Regular	Characteristic of normal political leader. Competency is a common way of describing any professional leader. It is not a characteristic of the kind of exceptional, personal qualities that are associated with charisma.
articulate	Regular	Characteristic of normal political leader. Charismatic leaders may be great speakers, but to describe someone as articulate implies that they are viewed as professional and competent.
fantastic	Charismatic	This is a likely emotional description of charismatic leader. Fantastic implies that the respondent believes there is something special, if hard to describe, about the leader.
believes in people	Charismatic	The respondent is describing a special connection between leader and his followers. This is indicative of charismatic more than regular leadership.
trustworthy	Regular	Characteristic of normal political leader. Trustworthiness is a common way of describing any professional leader. It is not a characteristic of the kind of exceptional, personal qualities that are associated with charisma.
Is blessed by God	Charismatic	The respondent is describing someone with an extraordinary, divine gift. This is very clearly indicative of the charisma of the person being described.
A powerful and persuasive character, I would follow him no matter what	Charismatic	That the respondent would support the leader “no matter what” implies an almost irrational or devotional level of support. It is not calculated in a way that is typical to the support of regular leaders.
A firm follower of the law	Regular	A regular leader would be expected to follow all norms and legal rules. A charismatic leader in

		contrast aims to write his or her own rules and depends on no one but the people for his or her authority.
efficient	Regular	Characteristic of normal political leader. Efficiency is a common way of describing any professional leader. It is not a characteristic of the kind of exceptional, personal qualities that are associated with charisma.
She is compassionate leader who instinctively knows what is best for her people	Charismatic	The respondent is saying that the leader has a special understanding of what the people want.
Knows what is going on so deserves complete discretion in running government	Charismatic	The respondent is saying that the leader has an instinctive understanding of what is needed to run government and that he or she shouldn't be constrained by any rules or processes in doing so.
A bit boring	Regular	This is not a special trait associated with charisma.
Friendly	Regular	While this is a positive character trait, it could be associated with any regular leader.
not afraid of standing up to regular politicians	Charismatic	The respondent is drawing a distinction between the leader and "regular" politicians. Clearly the respondent favors the way the leader does this. It should be viewed as charismatic.
unlike any other leader in the world and in my view the best	Charismatic	The respondent is drawing a very positive distinction between the leader being described and all other leaders. The respondent believes there is something special and good about the leader.
is very convincing. I don't know why.	Charismatic	The respondent finds that the leader is persuasive. Regular leaders can also be persuasive but it tends to be for rational reasons that people can easily understand. In this case, the respondent finds the leader persuasive on some emotional or irrational level.
a dog	Regular	The respondent clearly finds the leader objectionable. This is not a charismatic trait.
I think God sent him to us	Charismatic	The respondent is saying that the leader is blessed or divine. This is strongly associated with charisma.
blessed	Charismatic	The respondent is saying that the leader has divine approval. This is strongly associated with charisma.
fair	Regular	While this is a trait for a leader of government to have, it could be associated with any regular leader.
A really strong leader who can take on anybody who challenges him	Charismatic	The leader being described is especially gifted with the ability to resist any normal challengers. This should be associated with charisma.
has word of honor	Regular	While this is a positive character trait, it could be associated with any regular leader.
possesses an amazing empathy for his people. I think we can trust him completely.	Charismatic	The respondent is saying that the leader has an instinctive understanding of what the people are thinking and that people can believe in the leader fully.
is somehow able to convince anybody to do whatever he wants.	Charismatic	The respondent finds that the leader is persuasive. Regular leaders can also be persuasive but it tends to be for rational reasons that people can easily understand. In this case, the respondent finds the leader persuasive on some emotional or irrational

		level.
greedy	Regular	This is not a special trait associated with charisma.
He has no respect for women	Regular	This is not a special trait associated with charisma.
He is a manipulator of people	Regular	Both regular and charismatic leaders can be manipulative. This is not unique to charismatic leaders.
Has a lot of years of experience which is valuable	Regular	This is not a special trait associated with charisma.
has many extraordinary accomplishments that I don't think any other leader could ever match	Charismatic	The respondent is describing a leader with extraordinary or unique achievements that make him or her special.
intelligent	Regular	While this is a positive character trait, it could be associated with any regular leader.
straight talker	Regular	While this is usually considered to be a positive character trait, it could be associated with any regular leader.
discreet	Regular	This is not a special trait associated with charisma.
the people simply adore her	Charismatic	The leader being described is not just respected or followed but 'loved'. This is not typical of a regular politician but of a leader with charisma.
distinguished	Regular	While this is a positive character trait, it could be associated with any regular leader.
elitist	Regular	This is not a special trait associated with charisma.
She is a truly outstanding leader the likes of which the world will never see repeated	Charismatic	The respondent is describing a uniquely brilliant leader. This kind of description is commonly associated with charismatic leaders.
studious	Regular	While this is a positive character trait, it could be associated with any regular leader.
serious	Regular	This is not a special trait associated with charisma.
calm	Regular	While this is a positive character trait, it could be associated with any regular leader.

Table A2 Populist Attitudes and Attribution of Charisma to Duterte by Region

Region	Mean Populist Attitudes	Mean Duterte Charisma
NCR	0.6152083	0.365
Balance Luzon	0.6393056	0.3816667
Visayas	0.6508333	0.385
Mindanao	0.6363889	0.4566667
<i>N</i> = 2,400		

Table A3 Mindanao Effect on Populist Attitudes and Attribution of Charisma to Duterte

	Mindanao	Non-Mindanao	P-Value (2-tailed test)
Populist Attitudes	0.6363889	0.6351157	(0.8243)
Duterte Charisma	0.4566667	0.3772222	(0.0006)
<i>N</i>	600	1,800	

Table A4 Class and Populist Attitudes and Attribution of Charisma to Duterte

	Social Class ABC	Social Class DE	P-Value (2-tailed test)
Populist Attitudes	.6297081	.6358899	0.5153
Duterte Charisma	.3389831	.4017094	0.1008
<i>N</i>	177	2,223	

Table A5 Populist Attitudes and Attribution of Charisma to Duterte by year

	2016	2017	P-Value (2-tailed test)
Populist Attitudes	0.6257986	0.6450694	0.0001
Duterte Charisma	0.4566667	0.3375	0.1008
<i>N</i>	1,200	1,200	

Table A6. Populist attitudes and charisma

	(1) (populist attitudes)	(2) (populist attitudes)
Charismatic leader	-0.004135 (0.0050886)	-0.00423 (0.00509)
Mindanao		0.00138 (0.00576)
Socio-economic class		-0.00631 (0.00953)
Constant	0.6366756 (0.003451)	0.637*** (0.00355)
Observations	2,400	2,400
Adjusted R^2	-0.0005	-0.001

Standard errors in parentheses

** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A7 Logit models of support for the anti-drug campaign

	(1) Support	(2) Truly Support
Populist attitudes	-0.0456 (0.590)	0.990** (0.391)
Charismatic leader	0.446*** (0.161)	0.418*** (0.0994)
Socio-economic class	-0.231 (0.237)	0.120 (0.170)
2017 dummy	-0.188 (0.163)	-0.178* (0.103)
Constant	2.018*** (0.398)	-0.928*** (0.263)
Observations	1789	1789

Standard errors in parentheses

** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A8. Ordered Logit models of rating of government performance on crime

	(1)
Populist attitudes	1.629*** (0.329)
Charismatic leader	0.239*** (0.0812)
Socio-economic class	-0.144 (0.154)
2017	-0.565*** (0.0814)
Mindanao	0.642*** (0.0925)
Observations	2,400

Standard errors in parentheses

** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

**Table A9. Ordered Logit Models of Support for Campaign against Illegal Drugs
controlling for potential victimization**

	(1) All respondents	(2) Only Fearful
Populist attitudes	3.836 ^{***} (1.284)	3.632 ^{**} (1.618)
Charismatic leader	0.0235 (0.326)	0.204 (0.412)
Socio-economic class	-0.165 (0.548)	-0.151 (0.634)
Fear	-0.611 (0.318)	
Constant	-4.606 ^{***} (0.910)	-5.138 ^{***} (1.158)
Observations	599	425

Standard errors in parentheses
^{**} $p < 0.05$, ^{***} $p < 0.01$

Table A10 Ordered Logit model of Support for the War on Drugs controlling for Trust in Duterte

	(1) Support war
Trust Duterte	0.676*** (0.0817)
Populist attitudes	1.105 (0.580)
Charismatic leader	0.261** (0.111)
Socio-economic class	-0.0128 (0.221)
2017 dummy	-0.173 (0.136)
Observations	1990

Standard errors in parentheses

** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$